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| Réalités sur le Sahara occidental : Document Wikileak. |
Wikileaks a mis en ligne plusieurs documents sur le Maroc. Le Journal El Pais dans son élan du journalisme pris à l'envers, en a pris certains, les a traduit en français pour plus d'impact sur les francophones que nous sommes et les a titré avec des titres qui n'ont rien à voir avec le document.
Et bien sur, le dit document -en anglais- est illisible par une grande majorité d'Espagnols qui en outre de leur langue maternelle ne savent rien lire d'autre.
En voici un exemple : ici le leak a comme titre : "MOROCCO'S MILITARY: ADEQUATE, MODERNIZING, BUT FACING BIG CHALLENGES" (Traduction : "Armée Marocaine : Adéquate, Moderne, mais fait face à de grands défis")
Pour El Pais, cela devient : "Maroc: Une Armée marginalisée et inefficace". La différence est de taille quand même.
Ceci n'est qu'une introduction, puisque ce même El Pais ne publiera probablement JAMAIS ce document Wikileaks qui parle des "Réalités du Sahara occidental" : Pour la simple raison qu'il détruit tout le populisme entretenu par une bonne partie de la presse Espagnole.
Ce document créé le 17/08/2009 à l'ambassade US de Rabat décrit la situation réelle dans le Sahara occidental et dont voici quelques extraits en Français.
Résumé :
"Le gouvernement Marocain (ndlr:désigné par "GOM" sur le document) a réalisé d'énormes investissements dans le Sahara, et certains observateurs estiment qu'il dépense 2,7 milliards de dollars par an sur ce territoire et ses 385.000 habitants."
"Le niveau de développement et de protection sociale dépasse clairement les niveaux d'autres régions au Maroc."
"La participation significative des électeurs - en dépit d'un appel du Polisario pour un boycott - aux élections locales du 12 Juin est peut être un signe que le soutien à l'indépendance est à la baisse et que le soutien pour l'autonomie est réel."
"Les officiels ayant causé de graves atteintes aux droits de l'homme ont été muté, et le respect des droits de l'homme dans le territoire s'est grandement améliorée, atteignant le même niveau que dans le Maroc."
"Toutefois, réclamer l'indépendance est encore une ligne rouge, et le GOM refuse d'enregistrer les ONG pro-Polisario."
"Donner plus d'autonomie au territoire, l'amélioration de relations algéro-marocaines, renforcer l'intégration régionale, renforcement de la confiance réelle, s'adressant à toutes les parties, et la propagande semblent essentielles pour résoudre les conflits." Fin du Résumé.
Le Roi Mohamed VI :
"Le Roi Mohamed VI est plus sûr, règne plus par l'amour que par la peur et ne rencontre aucune réelle menace au niveau interne".
L'investissement au Sahara :
"A part quelques détournements, l'investissement (ndlr : du Maroc dans le Sahara) a produit des niveaux élevés de développement urbain par rapports aux régions du Maroc ce qui a rendu la capitale du Sahara -la ville de Laayoune- la première ville sans bidons villes."
"Les indicateurs sociaux comme l'accès à un haut niveau d'éducation, aux services sociaux dépassent les normes marocaines et dépassent de loin celles d'autres villes de taille comparable au Maroc."
"La croissance de l'économie Marocaine a réduit l'impact de ces dépenses et les a rendu beaucoup plus supportable par l'économie que par le passé."
Les élections locales du 12 juin : "Le régime Polisario type cuba"
Le document décrit la concurrence entre les partis politiques et les notables de la région dans les élections du 12 juin.
"Cette réelle compétition politique, qui peut-être perçue comme n'étant pas démocratique, est de loin plus Ouverte que le système Polisario qui est de type Cuba (Cuba-Like)."
Les colons selon la presse espagnole décrit par le document comme étant des Sahraouis :
"Après avoir pris le contrôle du Sahara occidental, le Maroc a tenté d'influencer le vote par la promotion de l'immigration par ses ressortissants, qui sont maintenant bien plus que la moitié des 385.000 de la population du territoire". (Note : un journal Espagnol s'arrêterait là dans sa traduction)
"Peut-être que la moitié des immigrants sont cependant eux-mêmes des Sahraouis des zones du nord de la ligne de démarcation qui ont été également quelques-uns des plus nationalistes parmi les Sahraouis."
Un commentaire fort intéressant du rédacteur de ce rapport :
"Commentaire: Curieusement, nous ne connaissons pas de partisan de l'indépendance des zones du Sahara qui regroupe à la fois le Sahara qui s'étend entre le Maroc, l'Algérie et la Mauritanie."
(ndlr:le rédacteur fait référence au Polisario qui ne réclame que la terre du Sahara qui se trouve sous administration Marocaine et non celle qui se trouve en Algérie et en Mauritanie. Il en conclut que le conflit est plus géopolitique que nationaliste lié à un vieux conflit entre le Maroc et l'Algérie)
Ce que veut la population :
"Des entretiens approfondis et de sources indépendantes dans le territoire suggèrent que l'objectif principal de la plupart des Sahraouis est plus l'autonomie que l'auto-détermination,..."
Ci -dessous, le document en totalité :
C O N F I D E N T I A L RABAT 000706 SIPDIS STATE FOR NEA/MAG, IO/UNP, PRM/AF AND DRL/NESCA NSC FOR MCDERMOTT E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/17/2019 TAGS: PBTS PHUM ECON PREF WI AG MO SUBJECT: WESTERN SAHARA REALITIES REF: RABAT 0693 Classified By: Charge d'Affaires, a.i., Robert P. Jackson for reasons 1 .4 (b) and (d). ¶1. (C) Summary: Although the Western Sahara negotiations have now re-started (Reftel), the conflict is 34 years old. The Government of Morocco (GOM) has invested tremendous resources in the territory, and some observers estimate that it spends USD 2.7 billion per year on the territory and its 385,000 residents. The level of development and of social services clearly exceeds the level in Morocco proper. Significant voter participation )- despite a Polisario call for a boycott -- in the June 12 local elections may be a sign that support for independence is waning although support for self-government is real. Serious human rights abusers have been transferred, and respect for human rights in the territory has greatly improved, reaching the same plane as in Morocco. However, advocating independence is still a red line, and the GOM refuses to register pro-Polisario NGOs. Giving the territory more autonomy, improving Algerian-Moroccan relations, enhancing regional integration, building real confidence, and addressing all parties, propaganda seem essential to resolving the conflict. End Summary. ¶2. (C) Since King Hassan II launched the Green March in 1975, the Western Sahara issue has been intimately linked to the stability of the throne and Morocco itself. Hassan, twice victim of coup attempts and for years at war with the left, used Western Sahara to bolster nationalism and park his army far away in the desert. More recently, however, that link has blurred. King Mohammed VI is more secure, maintained in power more by love than fear and facing no apparent major domestic threat. He recently has somewhat distanced himself from the issue, however, and has not visited the territory in three years, a stark contrast to his peripatetic ribbon cutting throughout the Kingdom. ¶3. (C) The GOM continues to subsidize the territory and provide tax and duty exemptions that form the base of much of the private fortunes there (mostly key clans loyal to the throne and a few senior military). Despite some siphoning, the investment has produced higher levels of urban development than in comparably sized cities in Morocco proper and made the capital, Laayoune, the first city without any shantytowns. Social indicators such as access to and level of education and availability of health care and social facilities exceed Moroccan norms and far surpass those in comparably sized Morocco,s cities. Growth in Morocco has made these expenditures much more bearable to Rabat,s exchequer than they once were. ¶4. (SBU) In April 2009, a local weekly newsmagazine TelQuel published an article laying out and likely even exaggerating what the Sahara was costing Morocco. TelQuel claimed that the GOM has spent 1.2 trillion dirhams on the territory since 1975 and is spending 3 percent of GDP or USD 2.7 billion per year, including the funds to maintain two-thirds of the Royal Armed Forces in Western Sahara. (Note: TelQuel faced no consequences for the article. Even with the relative expansion of the freedom of the press in Morocco to cover subjects formerly taboo, this was astonishing. End Note.) ¶5. (C) In the June 12 local elections, &First Friend8 Fouad Ali el Himma,s Party of Authenticity and Modernity (PAM) challenged local Laayoune strongman and Royal Consultative Council for Saharan Affairs (CORCAS) head Kalihenna Ould er Rachid. The PAM lost, despite having an el Himma protege installed. The Ould er Rachid family and clan control the Tammany Hall-like Istiqlal party machine that has run the territory for many years, and played a major part in winning the Prime Minister,s chair for party head Abbas El Fassi. Voter participation in the Sahara, stoked by clan rivalries, was far above the norm, despite a Polisario-declared boycott. Some pro-independence Sahrawis reportedly voted for the Ould er Rachid because they alone were deemed strong enough to stand up to the government in Rabat. This real political competition, while perhaps not democracy, seems far more open than the Cuba-like Polisario system. It underscores the fact that there is a significant part of the population of the Sahrawi territory, in addition to most immigrants, who support Moroccan sovereignty. ¶6. (C) After it took control of Western Sahara, Morocco tried to affect any vote by promoting immigration by its nationals, who now are well over half of the some 385,000 residents of the territory. Perhaps half of the immigrants, however, were themselves Sahrawis, from areas just north of the dividing line that were also home to some of the most nationalistic Sahrawis. In a referendum that could include independence, they are not seen by the GOM as reliable voters, partly explaining GOM reluctance to go to a vote. (Comment: Curiously, we know of no advocate of independence that has ever claimed the &Sahrawi8 territories in Morocco, Algeria or Mauritania as part of a national homeland, although some members of the CORCAS unsuccessfully tried to include the Moroccan parts in the autonomous region, when it was first proposed. The absence of such larger nationalism, along with the Polisario,s 1970,s war against Mauritania --the world,s only Sahrawi state -- suggest the conflict is less nationalist than geopolitical, linked to the much older dispute between Algeria and Morocco, and hardly boosts the case for an independent state. End Comment.) ¶7. (C) Given the small population at stake, Spain,s granting of Spanish nationality, with the possibility of migrating to Spain, its nearby Canary Islands or elsewhere in Europe, is significant, and, indeed in better times, resettlement could be a simple way of resolving the plight of the refugees. ----------- Who Counts? ----------- ¶8. (C) The UN process recognizes the parties in the negotiations as Morocco and the Polisario. This asymmetry makes any resolution difficult, as it does not recognize the determinative role of Algiers, which the Moroccans see as their real adversary in this dispute. It also neglects the diverse views among the Sahrawis. --------------------------------------------- - Human Rights: Progress but Continuing Paranoia --------------------------------------------- - ¶9. (U) The human rights situation in the territory has dramatically improved since a brief &intifada8 in 2005. Like Morocco itself, Western Sahara has come a very long way from the mass disappearances of the &years of lead8 during Hassan II,s reign. Pro-Polisario Sahrawis are able to organize under the rubric of human rights activists, which most of them legitimately pursue, such as last year,s RFK award winner, Aminatou Haidar from the Sahrawi Collective of Human Rights Defenders (CODESA). In just over a year, restrictions on their international travel have disappeared. ¶10. (C) Since mid-2008, once common beatings and arbitrary imprisonment have also essentially ceased. One key to the reduction in abuses last year was the transfer of long-serving security officials with consistent records as abusers. Activists and officials confirmed in July 2009 that more transfers (many by promotion) had recently taken place, and most well known abusers are reportedly now gone. All sources report the territory is quiet, with residents hopeful for some political progress. ¶11. (C) What opponents of Morocco cannot do is explicitly organize in favor of independence or a referendum thereon, nor can they publish or even distribute tracts on the subject. In addition, they are denied by the government the right to operate as legal entities. Establishing these rights would not only be just, but would help build confidence in a consensual solution that would involve re-integration. The Sahrawi Association of Human Rights Victims (ASVDH) has even obtained court approval for its registration as an NGO and won on appeal lodged by the Interior Ministry (MOI), but has not been able to get local officials to accept its registration. The USG has pushed for this for some time. We recently heard that the local Wali has proposed to MOI that it accept the registration but the decision is pending. We should press the GOM on this both here and in Washington. ¶12. (C) Despite this substantial progress, which leaves the human rights situation in Western Sahara nearly equivalent to Morocco, Morocco campaigned for most of the year and spent scarce diplomatic capital in a successful effort to push back proposals for the UN to have a monitoring role on this issue. It is possible that they have understood the opportunity costs of that strategy and appear more recently to have been somewhat less vocal on the issue. -------------------- What the People Want -------------------- ¶13. (C) Extensive interviews and independent sources in the territory suggest that the principal goal of most Sahrawis is more self-government than self-determination; a desire more for protection and identity than independence, an army and embassies. The small vocally pro-Polisario minority, including many of the human rights activists, formerly enjoyed the support of the &silent majority8 of these Sahrawis, particularly during periods of repression. Development and reduced oppression have reduced this support. The Sahrawi &silent majority8 in the territory has been intrigued by the prospect of autonomy and has generally quietly awaited its development. Recently, a pro-Polisario activist, when asked, confided to us that he believed that in a free election held now a majority of voters in the territory would choose autonomy. ----------------------------- On the Other Side of the Berm ----------------------------- ¶14. (C) While not the competent Mission to comment on the Polisario or the camps, Embassy Rabat understands the situation for the refugees in Tindouf is difficult but support for the Polisario appears strong. Nevertheless, we hear from credible Sahrawis that there is growing interest there in a negotiated solution, belying the stories of unrealistic saber-rattling, frequently attributed to Sahrawi youth. GOM calls for a census and audit of international programs seem reasonable to us. Finally, if there is no prospect of a solution, re-settlement should be considered an option. The Spanish decision in 2008 to accord passports to 1975 residents of its former colony could be implemented in Tindouf as it has been in Laayoune (but not in the current economic climate). ------------------- Frozen Negotiations ------------------- ¶15. (C) Meanwhile, the UN Secretary General,s Personal Envoy for Western Sahara has struggled to get the UN negotiations back on track. The negotiation process re-started in 2007, after Morocco tabled a proposal for autonomy that had been carefully negotiated with the Bush Administration. The main impetus to getting the plan produced was then-USUN Permrep John Bolton,s threat (October 2006) to end MINURSO,s mandate. When first released, the USG called the autonomy proposal &serious and credible.8 In substance, the proposal was serious, including local police and some independence for the judiciary, and was accompanied by a declared willingness to negotiate. It was also viewed as credible by the international community, including explicitly Russia and implicitly China, which nearly universally expressed a willingness to accept this as a possible outcome, if agreed. Credibility was an issue, however, among Sahrawis on both sides of the berm, as there was little confidence, given past Moroccan evasions, that even if agreed, the GOM would implement the plan. This credibility gap has narrowed, but only slightly, due to the improvements in the human rights situation. Credibility is, therefore, key to winning hearts and minds. ¶16. (C) In April 2007, the United Nations Security Council lengthened the mandate of MINURSO to 12 months (from six) and the &Manhasset talks8 (named after the Long Island, New York town where they were held) began. The Moroccans, while negotiating with the Polisario, showed them no credence and sent Moroccan Sahrawis to seek defectors. CORCAS head Kalihenna questioned the Polisario,s right to be there. The Polisario broke diplomatic and Middle Eastern protocol by refusing to shake hands with the Sahrawis on the Moroccan delegation and walked out or turned away when they spoke. ¶17. (C) Neither side offered any compromise or considered the arguments of the other. This was hardened when, at the end of 2007, King Mohammed VI publicly instructed his delegation to discuss no solution but autonomy, creating little room for discussion. This hard-line stance may have been bolstered by what was perceived in the Palace as uncritical support from Washington. In the end, there was no result after four rounds of rotating restatement of static positions. Former UN Personal Envoy Peter Van Walsum cited immovable Moroccan commitment to retain sovereignty, and called the prospect of independence unrealistic. For this unusual frankness, the UN let Van Walsum go, at Algerian and Polisario insistence. ¶18. (C) The new Personal Envoy, Ambassador Christopher Ross, long one of the stars of U.S. diplomacy in the region, seems better positioned than anyone to budge President Bouteflika and his government. In recognition, he was granted the additional mandate to help improve Moroccan-Algerian relations. King Mohammed VI took note of this and conveyed through Ross an offer of unconditional, at-any-level and on-any-subject, bilateral talks. Ross did get Algeria to agree to go to the &informals8 but only as observers. He got no response on the bilateral issue, although it is still early in Bouteflika,s new term. The informal meeting this month in Vienna has at least re-launched the negotiations. --------------------------------------------- -------- Regional Link: Algeria-Morocco Key to Sahara Solution --------------------------------------------- -------- ¶19. (C) Algeria and Morocco are demographically similar but with differences in historical experience that go back hundreds of years. About a year after Algeria,s hard-won independence, it and Morocco fought &The War of the Sands,8 over their then-disputed frontier, drawn by colonial France. In 1975, when the Algerians sheltered the Polisario, it was at least as much a reflection of their historical rivalry as ideological support for a fellow liberation movement. King Hassan II managed to work out a frontier agreement with the Algerians which the GOM maintains has been ratified, and needs only an exchange of instruments of ratification. The subsequent closure of the Algeria-Moroccan border is now an anomaly in a Mediterranean region of growing links. There have been modestly growing functional links in recent years, much of it under Arab Maghreb Union auspices and in 2008 some technical agreements were signed. But direct high-level communication remains cut and both quiet and public GOM overtures to reopen it have been rebuffed. The Government of Algeria (GOA) turned down then-Secretary Rice,s invitation for a trilateral ministerial meeting on the margins of the 2008 UNGA. ------- Comment ------- ¶20. (C) Algeria, Morocco and the Western Sahara dispute is a chicken and egg situation. Algeria has indicated relations cannot improve until there is self-determination in Western Sahara. Morocco, following the close links between the Polisario leadership and their Algerian hosts, remains convinced that there will be no agreement if relations with Algiers do not improve. In response, as of June 2009, the Moroccans have maintained that their principal goal now is rapprochement with Algeria, which could be discussed separately. ¶21. (C) The international community is ready to support Maghreb rapprochement and integration, which can only occur in parallel with a settlement of the longstanding dispute over the Western Sahara and resettlement of the long-suffering refugees. Then-President Putin of Russia urged Algerian-Moroccan compromise in vain, as have the French, the Spanish, and the USG. We are not aware of any of the P-5 opposing an autonomy-based solution, nor have we seen real urgency or priority for the international community to resolve a dispute over which there has been no real fighting for 18 years. End Comment.